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Abstract: Heeding recent calls to explore the contributions of creative 
political actors other than federal judges to the process of American legal 
development, this article examines the role of state attorneys general (SAGs) 
during the period of rapid industrialization of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Consistent with recent revisionist accounts concerning 
the extent of government power during this era of supposed "laissez-faire," I 
find that SAGs during this period actively and creatively employed ancient 
common law legal theories in new ways to address the emerging corporate 
order during this time. Relying on a review of state court cases and 
newspaper accounts from the period, I examine how SAGs pursued the 
"public interest" by seeking injunctions against businesses and even corporate 
dissolution through their use of public nuisance and quo warranto theories. 
This litigation served as a form of regulation through litigation at a time in 
which administrative solutions were lacking and also influenced statutory 
developments during the period.  
 
Keywords: state attorneys general, litigation, law, courts, states, American 
political development  
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Polity, Vol 44, No. 3 (2012): pg. 373-399. DOI. This article is © Palgrave Macmillan and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Palgrave Macmillan] does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Palgrave Macmillan. 
2 
 
The Gilded Age of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries has been the focus of a long and often contentious line of 
legal scholarship examining the relationship between American law, 
politics, and the economy. Overlooking much of this historiography 
have been the works of Charles Beard, Frank Goodnow, and other 
early Progressives who argued that a "laissez-faire constitutionalism" 
exemplified law during the Gilded Age.1 In this conception, law and 
legal institutions fundamentally entrenched liberal laissez-faire 
economic doctrines during this period, highlighted most clearly by the 
Supreme Court's infamous 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York. 
Similarly, scholars such as Morton Horwitz argued that the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the crystallization 
of "Classical Legal Thought" in American law, embracing ideas 
compatible with "laissez-faire liberalism" and the "night watchman 
state."2 This flowed from the gradual development of the common law 
in the decades prior to the Civil War, which subsidized private 
enterprise at the expense of weaker and less organized groups.3 
Christopher Tomlins argues that there was a shift from the Founding 
and the early nineteenth century from a democratized ideology of the 
communal good represented in the discourse of police powers to an 
emphasis on judge-made common law promoting stability and 
providing protection from "democratic excess."4  
While this interpretation of law during the Gilded Age dominated 
post-World War II historical accounts of the era and remains strong in 
contemporary scholarship,5 other scholars have challenged this view. 
The rethinking of this era began with the work of Charles McCurdy, 
Alan Jones, and others and has continued to the present.6 William 
Novak, for example, emphasized the importance of the salus populi 
("the people’s welfare") existing in the early American state.7 In a 
similar vein, Howard Gillman argued that the law of the Lochner Era 
was not simply a reflection of unrestrained free-market ideology on the 
part of federal judges, but contained principled distinctions based upon 
a vision of republican citizenship dating back to the Founders. Gillman 
notes that courts were concerned not with all regulations, but only 
those that promoted "class" or partial interests of particular groups 
rather than the general welfare.8 Gerald Berk argued that two distinct 
paths to industrialization contended during the Gilded Age. The first 
reflected a laissez-faire corporate liberalism emphasizing the private 
sphere over the public, but the second was a competing model of 
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"regional republicanism" that "conceived property and the corporation 
to be public conventions." According to Berk, law in the late nineteenth 
century reflected both of these alternative tracks to industrialization.9  
In the view of these scholars, the American state was stronger 
and more interventionist than suggested by the assumptions of 
"laissez-faire" dominance during the Gilded Age. They also suggest 
that law during the period is best characterized not as a constitutional 
limit on the growth of the American state, but as a creative and 
distinctive source of governmental authority.10 As Novak argued, "the 
technologies of American state development and regulation in this 
period were overwhelmingly legal in nature and in practice," "in 
contrast to the dominant techniques and strategies of continental 
European statecraft." Rather than impeding state economic controls, 
American law provided innovative tools with which to redefine 
government-business relationships.11  
This reinterpretation of the role of law during the Gilded Age has 
occurred alongside a call for scholars to reconsider the judge-focused 
nature of legal scholarship concerning this period. As Novak put it, 
legal scholarship has too often "fetishized courts and judges and 
radically understated the role of other creative lawmakers in the 
American tradition."12 A narrow focus on judges threatens to obscure 
the role of creative and entrepreneurial legal actors who have also had 
a significant impact on the direction of American legal development.  
In this article, I suggest that a closer examination of the 
important if often underappreciated role played by one set of these 
entrepreneurial legal actors – state attorneys general (SAGs) – will 
help to fill in more of the picture of the role of law during the Gilded 
Age. In particular, the ways in which SAGs mobilized legal authority 
during the Gilded Age help to illustrate how law could be used as a 
creative force for stronger and more forceful governmental 
intervention. It also illustrates that whatever the position of the federal 
courts – frequently portrayed as largely adopting laissez-faire 
ideologies – other legal actors at the state level, including SAGs and 
state judges, were attuned to a republican rather than laissez-faire 
view of corporate authority. During this period, several SAGs wrestled 
with the question of how to address the intense public demand for 
control of the commercial sector while often lacking the express 
authority to act. Their solution lay in the novel use of their common 
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law powers, which aimed at regulating these new entities in the name 
of the "public interest."  
While the SAGs' innovative use of common law litigation ran into 
barriers as a way of effectively regulating the emerging national 
economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, their 
activities during this period are important for several reasons. First, in 
line with contemporary scholarship, it indicates the creative nature of 
law during this period. Faced with new problems linked to emerging 
industrialization and a lack of administrative solutions, SAGs used 
innovative litigation to pursue regulatory controls on business. 
Applying old principles of the common law to address new issues, 
SAGs achieved injunctions against business and dissolution of 
corporate charters during this time in the name of the public interest. I 
suggest that this use of the common law served to advance a certain 
republican conception of government-business relations, in contrast to 
assumptions of common law as a method of entrenching "laissez-faire" 
values. The SAGs fit the "public interest" mold particularly well since 
they were tasked with pursuing the general interest in their litigation, 
and not merely the special class interests of any particular group. This 
activity illustrates the common law as reflecting democracy and not 
simply serving as a tool of industry or as protection against 
"democratic excess."  
Second, this focus on state-level political development fits into 
Julie Novkov's call for "bringing the states back in" to American 
political development.13 These litigation campaigns illustrate how 
entrepreneurial political actors used their position to channel political 
discontent in a way helping influence the development of common and 
statutory law on the state and federal level. Because of the SAGs' 
unique institutional position, these state litigators were able to serve 
as opportunity points for the expression of the “public interest” in the 
absence of administrative mechanisms or actions by other political 
institutions. Relying on the common law and using their position as the 
legal representatives of their state to get into court, these SAGs acted 
against major business entities in the absence of explicit legislative 
command or the existence of a strong administrative state. These 
actions helped to influence legal and statutory development on the 
state and federal levels.  
Third, the actions of SAGs during the Gilded Age help place the 
high-profile activities of modern SAGs in more historical context. 
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Several scholars have begun to explore the role of contemporary 
SAGs,14 whose activities have included litigation aimed at regulating 
tobacco companies, gun manufacturers, polluting energy firms, the 
lead paint industry, and Wall Street companies. Nevertheless, little 
scholarship examines the role of SAGs before the modern era.15 The 
modern-day SAGs' use of the common law to regulate business in the 
face of alleged administrative inaction has an analogue in their 
predecessors' use of the common law to regulate business entities in a 
time prior to the full-fledged administrative state. Further, it was 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the SAGs 
first realized that pursuing the "public interest" against large 
corporations required increasing collaboration among themselves, 
leading to the creation of new mechanisms including the National 
Association of Attorneys General – an organization that has played a 
key role in contemporary multistate lawsuits.  
 
The Office of the State Attorney General  
 
The office of the attorney general traces its origins to medieval 
England, where the King and other noblemen retained attorneys to 
handle several governmental tasks. Several of the American colonies 
established attorneys general early on in their existence, generally 
retaining the office during the transition from colonies to states. 
Several states placed the office in state constitutions and, unlike the 
U.S. Attorney General, the office was transformed from an appointed 
to elective position in most states beginning in the Jacksonian Era.16  
The switch in selection method in most states to separate 
statewide election offered SAGs a level of independence from other 
state-level political institutions. Their separate statewide election 
allowed them to be directly responsible to the people as opposed to 
the governor or the state legislature. This autonomy was particularly 
important because SAGs were (and are) singly responsible for most or 
all of their state’s legal services.17 This ability to independently 
represent the state's legal interests led one former New York Attorney 
General, writing just before the start of the New Deal period, to note 
that because of its place in state government, "the office of the 
Attorney-General, of necessity, is most intimately associated to the 
development of the law."18  
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Most SAGs had broad common law powers inherent to the office 
that were not specified constitutionally or statutorily and which could 
be used in the name of the "public interest."19 As one Maine court 
stated in the early twentieth century, the attorney general "is clothed 
and charged with all the common-law powers and duties pertaining to 
his office." This allowed SAGs to "exercise all such power and authority 
as public interests may from time to time require, and may institute, 
conduct, and maintain all such suits and proceedings as he deems 
necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the states, the 
preservation of order, and the protection of public rights."20  
The common law powers SAGs retained when colonies became 
states "were so numerous and varied as to discourage the framers of 
the state constitutions and legislatures from setting them out in 
complete detail," thus permitting the SAG to draw upon the long 
common law traditions of English attorneys general to fill in gaps in 
their express powers.21 Because of the breadth of these common law 
powers, it is virtually impossible to list them comprehensively.22 
Nevertheless, several early court cases give an indication of the sort of 
powers the common law provided. One of the most important of such 
cases is People v. Miner, a New York state court case decided in 1868. 
The opinion lists several of the SAGs’ traditional common law powers, 
including the broad ability to prosecute crimes and all actions 
necessary for the "defense of property and revenues of the crown" as 
well as specific powers he could use to target other wrongdoing 
against the sovereign. Because of their application to corporations, I 
focus on two of these powers for the purposes of this article. Under 
English common law, attorneys general had the duty: first, "[b]y writ 
of quo warranto, to determine the right of him who claims or usurps 
any office, franchise or liberty, and to vacate the charter, or annul the 
existence of a corporation, for violations of its charter, or for omitting 
to exercise its corporate powers"; and second, "to prevent public 
nuisances."23 Though People v. Miner was a state case from New York, 
other state courts have frequently cited this enumeration to describe 
the inherent powers of their respective SAGs.24  
These common law powers played a particularly important role 
for SAGs in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as several 
wrestled with the question of how to best address the emergence of 
big business during this period. In a foreshadowing of more recent 
litigation, SAGs applied the common law in new and innovative ways, 
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providing the legal justification for changes demanded in the name of 
the "public interest." When courts and limited the possibilities of 
successful business regulation with one particular common law tool 
(such as public nuisance), SAGs would turn to others (such as quo 
warranto) to achieve their regulatory goals.  
 
State Attorneys General in the "Gilded Age"  
 
As many scholars have documented, post-Civil War America 
witnessed a number of substantial societal and economic changes, 
including a tremendous burst of industrialization. The rise of big 
business during this "Gilded Age" stirred feelings both of pride and 
anxiety among Americans.25 Even as the positive side of economic 
development led to optimism about future progress, the downsides of 
rapid business growth led to calls for greater regulation of business.  
As Howard Gillman has written, this period was one in which 
much tension existed between older republican notions and the 
emerging industrial state. The transformation of the economy began 
eroding "the assumption about market liberty and republican 
independence that justified the prohibition against factional or class 
politics."26 The cherished image of the independent and self-employed 
artisan or farmer increasingly gave way to the reality of a growing 
number of Americans employed by others. While government 
intervention in the economy had been most commonly associated with 
"the capacity of special interests to interfere" with natural market 
relations,27 the rise of the "new power" of these great corporations 
prompted a rethinking of the government's role in promoting the 
public interest.  
The role that SAGs could play in helping along this rethinking in 
this era of the emergence of rapid industrialization was the subject of 
a particularly interesting decision authored by Judge Edward Ryan of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Attorney General v. The Chicago and 
Northwestern Railway Co. (1874). In this case, the Wisconsin Attorney 
General sued two railroad companies, seeking to prevent them from 
charging fees in excess of the maximum rates allowed by a statute 
enacted the same year. The companies replied with several 
constitutional defenses, including that the statute was a violation of 
the takings clause, the Contract Clause, and due process under the 
state and federal Constitutions. Against these individual rights claims, 
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the SAG argued that though the railroads were funded by private 
investment, they were essentially "public" businesses because the 
companies’ charters were granted by the state legislature, a public 
body. The charter could be altered and even revoked if abused by the 
recipient of the charter, because the granting of the corporate charter 
implied that the corporation must operate consistent with notions of 
the public interest. Implicit in the SAG’s argument was the notion that 
his office was the appropriate entity to enforce this conception of the 
railroad companies as "public" companies.28  
In a lengthy decision, Judge Ryan sided with the attorney 
general. Relying in part on an analysis of English common law, he 
noted that the attorney general had the power to act when "any 
corporation is doing acts detrimental to the public welfare, or hostile to 
public policy." According to Judge Ryan, the common law of England 
and America alike now confronted "a new power, unknown to its 
founders, practically too strong for its ordinary private remedies." This 
"new power" was the emergence of the great corporations, those 
"aggregations of capital and power," with influence so large "that few 
private persons could litigate with them."29 This change in 
circumstances warranted the expansion of the common law power of 
the attorney general to represent the public interest.  
Judge Ryan’s decision highlights how the growth of corporate 
power created stress in older notions of what the common law could 
accomplish and what the public interest required. This new situation 
demanded greater government oversight of business to ensure that 
companies were acting in the public interest. As Judge Ryan realized, 
SAGs could be key players in representing the public interest against 
the "new power" of the great corporations. And indeed they were, as a 
number of entrepreneurial SAGs increasingly used the common law as 
a way to regulate corporations. They took advantage of their position 
as their state’s chief legal officer to counter the downsides of business 
growth, whether this came in the form of pollution affecting public 
waters, harmful activities of railroad corporations, or monopolies that 
worked as "conspiracies against the public."  
The SAGs’ role as frequent foes of corporate entities in this era 
occurred before the emergence of full-scale bureaucratization and 
before the explosion of federal statutes targeting corporate behavior in 
the twentieth century. The following two sections examine how the 
SAGs used two common law principles – public nuisance and quo 
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warranto – to regulate powerful business entities. I chose to pursue 
my examination in this way because if the SAGs were indeed 
important political players as Judge Ryan anticipated, then we would 
expect them to be active against two of the key emerging business 
entities emerging during the nineteenth century – the railroads and 
the trusts. A closer look at the period demonstrates that SAGs were 
indeed active against these entities, using the common law not as a 
conservative tool for the privileged but as a legal weapon in the fight 
to maintain public control over rising corporate power.  
 
Public Nuisance as a Regulatory Device  
 
Several of the earliest suits brought by SAGs to regulate the 
new business entities relied upon public nuisance theories. Nuisance 
actions, alleging unlawful use of property causing injury to others, 
have long been recognized in the common law dating back to twelfth-
century England. English courts recognized early on a distinction 
between "private" and "public" nuisance. Private nuisance grew out of 
the law of property, and involved interference with the use of an 
individual's real property. Public nuisance, by contrast, involved 
activities interfering with the general rights of the public at large. 
Unlike its private counterpart, public nuisance was linked with criminal 
law, allowing public prosecutors to obtain injunctions against activities 
harmful to the public. Under the common law, it was considerably 
easier for public prosecutors to bring public nuisance actions than it 
was for private parties, as any private individual seeking to abate 
public nuisances was required to show "special injury" separate from 
general harm to the public before an action could be sustained. Public 
prosecutors were not subject to this limitation.30  
William Novak notes that in American law, the "common law of 
nuisance was one of the most important public legal doctrines of 
nineteenth-century regulatory governance," reflecting the desire to 
secure social order and the well-regulated society.31 Many of the early 
examples in which American courts allowed the abatement of a public 
nuisance involved situations in which persons obstructed public 
highways or waterways, commonly known as "purprestures." Public 
nuisance also targeted certain activities offending public morals, such 
as gambling, prostitution, or the use of profane language.32 This usage 
was similar to how English courts applied public nuisance.33  
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As the enumeration contained in the previously mentioned 
People v. Miner indicates, the general power to "prevent public 
nuisances" was recognized in America as one of the several common 
law powers within the purview of SAGs. The extent of this power, 
however, was neither specified in any great detail nor subject to clear 
limitation. As one deputy Attorney General remarked in recent times, 
"[i]t requires only a little imagination to see the potential use an 
Attorney General might make of his broad authority to seek abatement 
of public nuisances."34 With the onset of industrialization in America, 
and particularly after the Civil War, several SAGs engaged in efforts to 
determine how far they could push their power to define a "public 
nuisance" in the courts. These lawsuits helped regulate private 
industry at a time in which the administrative state was in an early era 
of development. As discussed below, SAGs found some level of success 
using the notion of public nuisance to regulate the growing power of 
businesses in the name of the "public interest."  
SAGs used public nuisance to target an array of business 
activities in the post-Civil War era. One usage occurred in an area we 
might now recognize as environmental law. As Noga Morag-Levine 
documents, the common law of nuisance was used to abate early 
forms of environmental harms. This often arose in the context of 
private nuisance, and included such situations as one individual suing 
his neighbor for damages over the "noxious vapors" escaping from the 
neighbor's animal pen.35 For environmental harms affecting the 
interests of the public at large, SAG could and did use common law 
public nuisance theories to enjoin allegedly harmful business activities.  
A good example of this usage is the California case of People v. 
Gold Run Ditch and Mining Co. (1884). This case involved a mining 
company that was found by the SAG to be dumping sand and other 
material from its mines into two rivers. The SAG sought an injunction 
preventing the dumping, arguing that the accretion of materials in the 
rivers threatened the destruction of immense tracts of land and the 
navigability of the rivers. After the SAG obtained the desired injunction 
from a lower court, the company appealed, claiming that the injunction 
was invalid because the mine was simply operating as a legitimate 
business and had acquired by prescription a private easement to use 
the river as it pleased. The company also challenged the ability of the 
SAG to bring this suit in the name of the public interest. The court 
disagreed with the company’s reliance on individual right, noting that 
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even a "legitimate private business…may grow into a force to threaten 
the safety of the people" such that it "violates the rights that belong to 
others." Further, analogizing the river to a public highway, the court 
held that the river was possessed by the state as a "public trust for the 
benefit of the people," and it was the purpose of the SAG to enforce 
these rights on behalf of the public.36 As a result, the court sided with 
the SAG and upheld the injunction prohibiting the company's practices.  
SAGs successfully enforced such public rights against private 
business even when the property being polluted was wholly under 
private control. In People v. Truckee Lumber Co. (1897), the California 
Attorney General sought an injunction to prevent a lumber company 
from depositing wood shavings and other materials into a stream, 
which had the effect of killing fish in the waters. The company claimed 
that because it owned the property rights in the stream and the 
surrounding lands, it was free to do what it wished, as its activities did 
not involve any public interest. The court dismissed this argument, 
holding that the pollution did involve the public interest, because the 
killing of fish (even within wholly private property) affected the 
availability of public fishing rights in the waters above and below the 
privately held land. The court relied upon the "universal principle that 
all property is held subject to those general regulations which are 
necessary to the common good and general welfare." As in the Gold 
Run case, the court stressed that the SAG had the power to bring this 
action on the behalf of the broad public interest, without relying upon 
a showing that any member of the public in fact had a complaint.37  
SAGs in other states brought similar successful cases involving 
what we might now recognize as "environmental law." This included 
actions restraining an oil company from "wasting natural gas" in its 
extraction procedures and enjoining an aqueduct company from 
draining a pond in such a way that would "create and expose upon the 
shores of said pond a large quantity of slime, mud and offensive 
vegetation very detrimental to the public health."38 Because of the 
absence of a bureaucratic regime empowered to tackle these various 
emerging environmental problems, these common law public nuisance 
actions aimed to fill in the resulting "regulatory gap."  
In addition to its use as an early regulatory device to address 
early environmental harms, SAGs sought to use public nuisance to 
limit the powers of the largest and most prominent industries at the 
time – the railroads. SAGs were an important and frequent courtroom 
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foe of the railroads in the post-Civil War period, bringing hundreds of 
lawsuits against the most important national industry at the time.39 
Several of these cases relied upon common law public nuisance 
theories to regulate various aspects of the industry.  
The use of public nuisance against the railroads, as well as 
against corporations generally, increased significantly during the last 
couple of decades of the nineteenth century and into the Progressive 
Era, eventually declining with the growth of the administrative state in 
the New Deal period.40 A Lexis-Nexis search of state court decisions 
revealed 106 separate common law public nuisance prosecutions 
brought by SAGs against railroad corporations from 1865 to 1915.41 
This number likely underestimates the total number of public nuisance 
cases SAGs initiated against the railroads, because the Lexis-Nexis 
database contains only appellate court decisions and neither 
unappealed lower court decisions nor cases settled out of court. Even 
this number reveals that SAGs prosecuted a number of cases against 
the railroads during this period, using theories of public nuisance in the 
name of the public interest. Moreover, a significant number of these 
lawsuits were ultimately successful, with SAGs winning just over 60% 
of these public nuisance lawsuits against railroad companies.  
SAGs representing states across the country employed public 
nuisance lawsuits against the railroads, led by Kentucky, New Jersey, 
and Pennsylvania.42 The sort of alleged nuisances targeted by SAGs 
varied widely. Reflecting the earlier uses of public nuisance to abate 
purprestures, some cases involved railroads allegedly obstructing 
public highways or waterways in ways constituting public nuisances.43 
SAGs also used the flexibility inherent in public nuisance to regulate 
other aspects of the industry as well. The previously noted Wisconsin 
case of Attorney General v. The Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. 
(1874) involved the SAGs' successful attempt to seek an injunction to 
prevent a railroad from charging fees in excess of the maximum rates 
allowed by a statute, despite the statute not explicitly allowing the 
equitable remedy of an injunction.44 SAGs in other cases successfully 
sought to enjoin railroads from charging excessive rates.45 Other 
public nuisance lawsuits alleged that railroad companies were not 
adequately maintaining their tracks or other structures,46 were using 
freight cars rather than passenger cars on a particular rail line,47 had 
allowed diseased animals from its cattle shipping station to enter the 
state,48 that a train's "smoke from its engines, its ringing of bells, and 
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its grinding of wheels" constituted a nuisance,49 and that a railroad 
company had willingly allowed people to "engage in dancing, drinking, 
tippling, cursing, swearing, being drunk, making loud noises and other 
misbehavior" on land owned by the railroad.50  
The use of public nuisance in particular was important in these 
cases in part because, as discussed above, private individuals were 
restrained in their use of public nuisance to remedy harms done to the 
public. The common law of public nuisance also provided SAGs the 
equitable remedy of injunction to restrain business activity, even if 
existing statutory law allowed only modest fines for violations of their 
provisions. In Hunt v. Chicago Horse and Dummy Railway Co. (1887), 
for example, the Illinois Attorney General sought to restrain a railroad 
company from constructing its railroad in certain streets of Chicago, 
which the Chicago city council had granted to the companies via an 
ordinance. The court agreed with the SAG that the city council’s action 
violated a portion of the general (statewide) incorporation act, and 
held the ordinance void. Importantly, the court held that the Attorney 
General was empowered to bring this suit based on his power to 
restrain public nuisances, despite no statute expressly granting him 
this power.51  
The public nuisance cases noted in this section help 
demonstrate one way in which SAGs used the common law to promote 
the "common good" and the public interest in the face of growing 
business activities in the 19th century. It was in this latter part of the 
nineteenth century that courts agreed with the role the SAG claimed in 
pursuing the "public interest." SAGs were able to pursue claims that 
essentially constituted an aggregation of private claims, but without 
the necessity for any particular private entity actually raising any 
claim. Indeed, because of the limitations courts placed on private 
lawsuits against public nuisances, SAGs (as well as other public 
prosecutors in a handful of states)52 were the only ones with the ability 
to do so. The flexibility of the common law of public nuisance could be 
and was used to regulate and restrain a variety of allegedly harmful 
corporate behaviors in an era prior to the development of a strong 
regulatory state.  
Many SAGs, however, soon ran up against limitations in of the 
public nuisance power as a tool to regulate business. As Noga Morag-
Levine notes, the use of the common law to abate environmental 
harms became more problematic as those harms multiplied in the age 
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of rapid industrialization.53 Additionally, some courts simply limited the 
application of public nuisance in certain regulatory contexts. For 
example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Attorney 
General v. Tudor Ice Co. (1870), rejected the SAG’s attempt to bring a 
public nuisance action against an ice company. The SAG had claimed 
that the company’s trade in non-ice products (including lumber, 
kerosene oil, and tobacco) went beyond the proper operations of an 
ice company and thus represented a threat to the public. The court 
disagreed, holding that since the ice company was a private trading 
company and "not in any sense a trustee for public purposes," the 
"acts complained of are not shown to have injured or endangered any 
rights of the public, or of any individual or other corporation; and 
cannot, upon any legal construction, be held to constitute a 
nuisance."54  
For these reasons, public nuisance was not capable of 
addressing some of the issues arising with the growth of corporations 
in the later nineteenth century. While public nuisance could be used as 
a potentially a broad power to regulate the dumping of pollution or the 
placement of buildings and railroad tracks, it proved incapable of 
addressing a policy issue that incited great public attention and outcry 
in the late nineteenth century – regulation of the trusts. SAGs' 
attempts to do so required them to develop other parts of their 
common law powers in innovative ways to vindicate the "public 
interest" against the great private corporations, including the power of 
quo warranto.  
 
Quo Warranto and the Problem of the Trusts  
 
The common law power of quo warranto, like public nuisance, 
traces its roots back centuries to early English law. Under English 
common law, the king’s attorney could issue a writ of quo warranto 
"against one who usurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of 
the crown, to inquire by what authority he supported his claim, in 
order to determine the right." A franchise unable to show authority for 
its exercise was liable to be seized by the king.55 This conception 
evolved both in England and America to include the ouster of 
individuals unlawfully claiming public office and, most relevant to this 
discussion, the revocation of corporate charters if the attorney general 
determined that the corporation abused the charter.56  
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Before the commonplace use of general incorporation statutes, 
most corporate entities had to receive special charters from their state 
legislatures in order to carry on business in their state.57 This reflected 
the view that the state's conferral of incorporation on corporations was 
not simply for private benefit but to further the general welfare and 
the public interest. Under this republican approach to corporate 
practice, state officials could use the charter process to monitor 
corporations and maintain a level of control over their activities.58 
Through their use of quo warranto proceedings against business 
entities, SAGs were an important part of this monitoring process, and 
increasingly so during the period of rapid industrialization following the 
Civil War.  
In the early to mid-nineteenth century, and even through the 
Gilded Age and into the Progressive Era, most quo warranto actions by 
SAGs concerned the traditional use of this tool to oust an official from 
an office held contrary to the law.59 However, with the rise of the large 
corporation during the Gilded Age, coupled with the absence of a 
strong administrative state able to monitor these entities, SAGs 
increasingly expanded common law quo warranto proceedings to 
include corporate defendants. At the heart of these lawsuits were 
allegations that the defendant corporation had claimed unauthorized 
privileges or failed to perform activities specified in the charter. The 
general theory used against corporate entities in these lawsuits rested 
upon an analogy to the traditional use of quo warranto to oust 
individuals illegally claiming offices of the crown, with the SAGs 
claiming that the corporate defendant's action or inaction violated a 
contract between the holder of the charter and the state. Due to the 
allegedly injurious nature of this conduct to the public at large, SAGs 
frequently sought the strictest remedies available under this common 
law quo warranto action – revocation of the charter and ouster of the 
corporation from the state. This remedy was thus "one of corporate 
death," representing "the extreme rigor of the law."60  
A Lexis-Nexis search of state court decisions from 1865 to 1915 
reveals approximately 400 quo warranto cases brought against 
corporations over this period.61 This search is again likely 
underestimating the total number of suits initiated by the SAGs by 
including only resolved appellate court cases not settled out of court, 
though it provides a good sense of the general use of this tool over 
this period. Much like their use of public nuisance, SAGs used quo 
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warranto to target a wide range of alleged corporate wrongdoing. This 
included suing companies for engaging in business activities beyond 
those specified in their corporate charters, similar to how the 
Massachusetts SAG attempted to use public nuisance to prevent an ice 
company from selling products other than ice. This usage was 
particularly prevalent in litigation against insurance companies, which 
often faced SAG litigation accusing them of selling different forms of 
insurance than specifically authorized by its charter.62 SAGs also 
brought lawsuits against companies for unlawfully collecting tolls on 
highways or canals,63 neglecting duties under corporate charters to 
provide certain products or services,64 failing to reveal corporate 
information to the state or to maintain adequate capitalization,65 
charging unreasonable amounts for services rendered such as bank 
interest or telephone services,66 selling intoxicating beverages,67 and 
failing to provide clean water to the public.68 In addition to their public 
nuisance strategy, SAGs employed quo warranto proceedings against 
the railroads for a variety of alleged wrongdoing.69  
Quo warranto proceedings were used by SAGs across the 
country, but particularly so in the Midwest, led by Ohio, Illinois, and 
Missouri.70 Indeed, eight of the ten states most frequently using quo 
warranto proceedings against corporations during this period were 
Midwestern states, with only Pennsylvania and Texas among those 
outside the Midwest. Table 1 indicates the regional variation in the use 
of quo warranto lawsuits against corporations during this period.  
 
[TABLE 1 HERE]  
 
That the use of quo warranto to oust corporations from doing 
business in the state was concentrated in states such as Ohio and 
Illinois aligns with the general political activism calling for greater 
business regulation across the Midwest and Great Plains during this 
period.71 Unlike much of the South and in many states further to the 
west, where calls for business regulation were also strong, these 
states also contained sizeable industry presence and more opportunity, 
if not need, for SAGs to use quo warranto procedures. As noted below, 
Midwestern SAGs, including those of Illinois and Ohio, were particularly 
prominent in employing high-profile common law quo warranto 
lawsuits to combat the rise of the trusts in the late nineteenth century.  
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Standard Oil attorney Samuel Dodd’s invention of the trust 
device in 1879 was soon to have an explosive impact on American 
society.72 Formally, "trusts" referred to the creation of large holding 
companies that would purchase the stock of several smaller 
companies, thus allowing the stockholders to combine capital and 
control a larger portion of the market. As Dodd himself noted, the term 
soon took on a wider significance, referring to every act done with the 
intent to monopolize business, restrain trade, or fix prices.73 By 1888, 
the New York Times and other leading newspapers blanketed their 
pages with stories involving the latest growth of a new "trust."74 The 
intense public outcry against these aggregations led to frantic efforts 
to determine how to restrain their power.75 There was little consensus 
among opponents of the trusts as to the best way in which to attack 
these new entities, but several high-profile and successful actions 
brought by SAGs demonstrated how the common law tools possessed 
by these officials, including quo warranto powers, could be used in an 
attempt to control the trusts. Many of these common-law concepts, 
developed in large part by attorneys general, found their way into the 
state and national statutes that created America's early antitrust 
regime.  
In these quo warranto suits, SAGs would claim that trusts 
usurped powers not granted under their corporate charters, whether 
these were special charters or issued under general incorporation 
statutes. Most commonly, SAGs would allege that the charters did not 
specifically authorize the corporation to buy and hold stock in other 
companies, and that the power to do so could not be simply implied 
from a legislative grant to engage in other activities (such as the 
manufacture and sale of products).76 Other quo warranto strategies 
relied on broader claims that the state incorporation statutes allowed 
only "the transaction of any lawful business," and that because 
contracts in restraint of trade were per se unlawful under the common 
law, the trust went beyond the terms of the incorporation statute.77 In 
these cases, the SAGs sought the remedy of ouster provided by 
common law quo warranto. While this remedy was "one of corporate 
death,"78 SAGs successfully obtained the dissolution of the targeted 
trust in all of their early quo warranto cases. Table 2 illustrates this by 
listing the SAG lawsuits against the largest and most notorious trusts 
during this period.  
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[TABLE 2 HERE]  
 
In the cases against the trusts noted in Table 2, the SAGs used 
quo warranto proceedings based upon the common law. Using this 
power, the SAGs were able to convince courts that the trusts, by 
forming monopolies and restraining competition within their particular 
industries, had assumed powers "dangerous to the public weal" 
beyond those granted in their corporate charters.79 They did so 
independently from any distinct legislative or administrative authority 
to control the trusts, relying instead on the common law.  
The identities of the SAGs in these cases against the trusts 
reflect to some extent the patterns of regional variation in the use of 
quo warranto generally. The Ohio SAG was the first to bring litigation 
against Standard Oil, and the SAGs in the Midwestern states of Illinois, 
Nebraska, and Missouri also prosecuted high-profile actions against 
trusts. Even so, the use of quo warranto against the trusts in 
Louisiana, California, and New York indicate that this was not wholly a 
regional phenomenon. The use of these lawsuits was also not the 
exclusive province of any one party, as Democratic and Republican 
SAGs alike brought quo warranto suits against the trusts at this time.  
Quo warranto litigation by the SAGs was important in at least a 
couple of ways. First and most directly, the litigation served as a 
mechanism for directly regulating the activities of business, including 
forcing corporate dissolution when the activities were contrary to the 
public interest. In the early state cases against the trusts, the SAGs 
achieved a series of high-profile successes. Secondly, SAG activities 
had an important effect on the development of state and national 
antitrust policy. Many state antitrust statutes, as well as the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890, reflected a reaction to the SAGs’ quo warranto 
cases brought against the trusts beginning in 1887. In fact, several 
state statutes generally codified the new understandings of antitrust 
quo warranto by expressly authorizing the SAGs to bring common law 
antitrust actions.80  
It comes as little surprise, therefore, that a number of SAGs 
were active in helping craft the language for these early antitrust 
statutes. For example, Texas’ strongly anti-monopoly Attorney 
General, James Stephen Hogg, was a key actor in forming the state’s 
anti-trust statute in March 1889.81 His previous experience battling the 
railroads through a variety of legal techniques led him to emphasize 
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the importance of preventing the formation of a monopoly in its early 
stages. This was reflected throughout the law as he helped draft the 
statute’s language together with a state legislative committee. Among 
other things, the statute contained broad language declaring void all 
contracts in restraint of trade and authorizing the SAG to initiate quo 
warranto proceedings in the event of a statutory violation.82 Several 
other states enacted statutes codifying the common law of quo 
warranto as developed in SAG litigation. These new antitrust laws 
allowed SAGs to file quo warranto actions against trusts, giving 
statutory backing to actions previously based upon the common law.83 
As noted below, SAGs continued bringing antitrust litigation in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth based upon 
this statutory codification of their quo warranto powers.  
The earliest quo warranto actions of the SAGs against the trusts 
noted in Table 2 helped influence the debate over the national 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 as well. As soon as Congress first 
began consideration of a federal antitrust bill in 1888, proponents of a 
national statute had to address concerns that the proposed regulations 
would signal a radical departure from existing law. To help reassure 
opponents of the bill, including the most prominent critic of the 
legislation, Senator James Z. George (D-MS), Sherman made the state 
cases a key part of his defense of the antitrust bill. In his major speech 
defending the bill on March 21, 1890, as well as in earlier speeches, 
Sherman argued that his proposal represented a reasonable response 
to the public outcry over the trusts – and one far preferable to 
solutions that would be proposed by "the socialist, the communist, and 
the nihilist" if Congress did not act.84 Sherman argued that far from 
being radical, the proposed act "does not announce a new principle of 
law, but applies old and well recognized principles of the common 
law." He continued by noting that the "power of the State courts has 
been repeatedly exercised to set aside such combinations."85 Sherman 
quoted directly from these state cases, including the "very clear and 
able opinion" of the New York court in the SAGs' case against the 
Sugar Trust, which Sherman argued set out the rule of the common 
law.86  
While Sherman argued that the principles in this litigation were 
"old and well recognized," the application to the emerging business 
combinations was in fact novel. By using quo warranto in this new 
way, the SAGs helped develop the common law and build the 
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precedent necessary for Senator Sherman to make this claim that "the 
common law" supported trust-busting. The existence of these state 
cases helped to provide an appearance of continuity between ancient 
legal principles and the aims of the Sherman Act, thus giving the Act 
the appearance of simply codifying existing law, rather than creating a 
new, far-reaching, or “radical” legal regime.  
Additionally, the subsequent history of these state cases 
bolstered Sherman's contention that federal action against the trusts 
was necessary. Following the early success of quo warranto litigation 
against the trusts, the SAGs soon discovered the limits of their ability 
to effectively use the quo warranto power against business interests. 
Most importantly, the trusts targeted in this state litigation 
increasingly took advantage of loose incorporation laws in other states, 
reorganizing themselves outside the reach of active state 
prosecutors.87 In particular, New Jersey’s general incorporation law 
adopted in 1889 contained the most liberal combination laws in the 
country, allowing corporations dissolved by state quo warranto actions 
to simply reorganize themselves as New Jersey corporations.88  
Sherman noted that because state court decisions were limited 
to the jurisdiction of their state, they were unable to alone adequately 
address the problem. State prosecutions could deal with intra-state 
combinations, but "only the General Government can deal with 
combinations reaching not only the several States, but the commercial 
world."89 The Sherman Act would "supplement the enforcement of the 
established rules of the common and statute law by the courts of the 
several States" in addressing combinations engaging in practices 
against the public interest.90 Given that the Sherman Act aimed to 
"supplement" the states' role, it is not surprising that the SAGs’ 
enforcement powers were generally not preempted under the Sherman 
Act or subsequent federal antitrust statutes.91 The lack of state 
preemption was important in the years following the Sherman Act 
because SAGs continued to bring antitrust litigation against trusts 
based upon new state statutes. This was particularly important after 
the Supreme Court limited the Sherman Act's application.  
Following enactment of the Sherman Act, the federal DOJ prosecuted 
few trusts under the law, a fact opponents of the trusts were quick to 
point out.92 When federal prosecutors did enforce the law, as they did 
against the American Sugar Refining Company, the U.S. Supreme 
Court sharply limited the reach of the act. In United States v. E.C. 
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Knight Co.93 (1895), the Court held that manufacturing (such as sugar 
refining) was a local activity that the federal government was unable 
to regulate under its Commerce Clause power. This interpretation had 
the practical effect of eviscerating much of the power of the Sherman 
Act for federal enforcement, with the Court stating that control of the 
trusts belonged at the state level:  
 
The relief of the citizens of each state from the burden of 
monopoly and the evils resulting from the restraint of trade 
among such citizens was left with the states to deal with, and 
this court has recognized their possession of that power even to 
the extent of holding that an employment or business carried on 
by private individuals, when it becomes a matter of such public 
interest and importance as to create a common charge or 
burden upon the citizen - in other words, when it becomes a 
practical monopoly, to which the citizen is compelled to resort, 
and by means of which a tribute can be exacted from the 
community - is subject to regulation by state legislative power.94  
 
Following E.C. Knight, SAGs became more heavily involved in 
calling for stronger national legislation and constitutional amendments 
to deal with the issue. Several statements to this effect were made 
during the proceedings of the Chicago Conference on Trusts held on 
September 13-16, 1899, which invited representatives "of all of the 
leading interests in the different sections of the United States."95 
Several SAGs attended and offered speeches, including a scathing 
address by E.C. Crow from Missouri. Crow excoriated the trusts for 
standing for "special privileges to the few, and unequal opportunities 
for the many," arguing that because corporations were but 
"creature[s] of the state and possessing only the power given it by the 
state, it should never be able to act or conduct its business as to 
interfere with the interests of the public." Crow also noted the effect 
"loose incorporation laws" were having on antitrust enforcement, 
leading him to argue that "our corporate laws must be remodeled." His 
chief recommendation was for an assembly of the governors and 
attorneys general to address this issue together and enact legislation 
to close these corporate loopholes.96 Other SAGs, including the Texas 
SAG, were more explicit about the necessity for "not only state 
legislation, but also national legislation" to "remedy the wrong" of the 
trusts and "protect the right of the people."97 Referencing E.C. Knight, 
the Attorney General of Maryland called for amendments to both 
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federal and state constitutions to allow for anti-trust legislation.98 
Likewise, the Indiana SAG "look[ed] with confidence to the general 
control of the entire subject by Congress" since the incorporation 
"loophole" discovered by the trusts made it impossible for state efforts 
to address the trust problem fully.99  
In the meantime, the limitation on the federal power to deal 
with monopolies announced in E.C. Knight thrust the issue back to the 
states. SAGs indeed continued to bring quo warranto actions against 
trusts at and beyond the turn of the twentieth century.100 These state 
cases illustrate SAGs’ continuing role as key opportunity points for 
trust opponents during the period between E.C. Knight and the "trust-
busting" administration of Theodore Roosevelt. The beginning of the 
revival of the Sherman Act during the first decade of the twentieth 
century was precipitated in part by SAGs, through the initiation of 
lawsuits against corporations such as the Northern Securities Company 
(a litigation effort eventually leading to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Northern Securities Co. v. United States101 (1904)) and by forcing 
federal acknowledgment of the limitations of purely state action 
against the trusts.  
Just as importantly for the SAGs' own institutional development, 
the problem of the trusts helped lead to greater lines of coordination 
among these state prosecutors. The increasing prevalence of 
multistate corporations establishing themselves under general 
incorporation statutes, and thus avoiding state quo warranto 
prosecutions, was a major impetus for SAGs to begin coordinating 
their efforts across state lines. Thirteen attorneys general met in St. 
Louis in 1907 to discuss issues common to several states, agreeing to 
establish a permanent national organization to present "a united 
front...in legal actions brought by different States against the same 
corporation or trust."102 Shortly after its creation, this new 
organization, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), 
served as a resource for SAGs bringing further actions against the 
trusts under state antitrust statutes. This included their first ever 
coordinated lawsuits against Standard Oil during the first decade of the 
twentieth century.103 NAAG remains in existence today and has been a 
critical resource for modern-day SAGs bringing multistate litigation 
against corporations in recent years.  
The SAGs' use of quo warranto prosecutions against the trusts 
was one part of a larger political struggle attempting to deal with new 
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issues of rapid industrialization during the Gilded Age and into the 
Progressive Era involving various state-level and federal actors. SAGs 
across the country, and particularly in the Midwest, had been 
increasingly using the common law of quo warranto throughout the 
Gilded Age as a legal weapon to control business entities alleged to 
have overstepped their role in promoting the public welfare. With the 
emergence of the trusts, several SAGs employed this common law tool 
against monopolies in the absence of existing state or federal statutes 
to successfully dissolve a number of the largest combinations at the 
time. Their prosecutions helped develop the common law, creating 
continuity between "established legal principles" and the new and 
emerging antitrust regulatory regime being created by state and 
federal governments.  
The use of quo warranto as a means of control of the trusts and 
other corporations reflected a republican response to the growth of 
business entities during post-Civil War industrialization. The chief 
remedy pursued in quo warranto prosecutions – revocation of 
corporate charters and subsequent "corporate death" – may seem 
overly harsh to modern eyes, but at the time reflected a regulatory 
approach viewing corporations as localized entities entrusted with 
acting consistent with the public welfare. Ultimately, this approach was 
challenged when, much as with their use of public nuisance, SAGs 
found that their ability to use the common law to regulate emerging 
business interests was limited. The use of loose general incorporation 
laws in states like New Jersey made the individual states' use of quo 
warranto prosecutions as a means to control the trusts largely 
ineffective. The SAGs adjusted to this new regime by advocating a 
larger federal role in antitrust, and in the meantime creating new lines 
of communication and collaboration between themselves in an effort to 
present a more united front against the trusts. The SAGs used this 
collaboration, as well as their now-codified powers under antitrust 
statutes, to attack the "trust problem" well into the twentieth century.  
 
The Unique Role of the State Attorneys General  
 
Much as private class action suits often exist parallel to actions 
brought by state attorneys general in modern times, SAGs' lawsuits 
were hardly the only actions brought against business interests at the 
time. A number of private litigators brought actions against trusts, for 
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example.104 Nevertheless, the office of the SAG had (and still have) 
several institutional traits facilitating the role that they played in the 
development of the law.  
For one, the fact that SAGs could rely on common law powers 
older than the United States itself granted them additional flexibility to 
pursue emerging policy issues, especially when these common law 
powers could be employed only by SAGs and not by private litigants. 
As noted earlier, courts had long recognized a distinction between 
public and private nuisance. Private litigants could bring actions based 
upon both legal theories, but the bar for private parties to bring public 
nuisance actions was placed quite high. As one leading legal treatise in 
1893 restated the common law, "no person can maintain an action for 
damages from a common nuisance where the injury and damage are 
common to all."105 That private parties needed to prove special 
damages in public nuisance actions while public parties (particularly 
SAGs suing in the name of the state) did not meant that the ability to 
enjoin harms done to the public at large rested largely with SAGs – a 
legal advantage that SAGs employed frequently.  
Likewise, only the state could initiate quo warranto lawsuits 
under the common law, while private parties could not. This was 
largely because quo warranto was an extraordinary legal remedy, and 
its use thus restrained. These proceedings could only be used to 
pursue the public interest, and could not be used for purely private 
purposes. A Minnesota case from 1889 expresses a representative 
view of quo warranto: "As such proceedings are in the nature of a 
public prosecution, having for their object the recovery to the state of 
a usurped or forfeited franchise, and not to redress private grievances, 
no one but the attorney general has authority to institute or prosecute 
them, it being exclusively for him to determine when public interests 
require them to be instituted."106  
The ability for SAGs to "exclusively" determine whether to use 
quo warranto aligns with the general notion that SAGs had (and still 
have) a great deal of flexibility and discretion in choosing the cases to 
add to their docket. The common law provided a legal resource that 
did not require express statutory or constitutional delegation, allowing 
these officials the ability to pursue litigation independently of other 
actors. One Texas court from 1893 sums up well the reason for 
allowing SAGs such broad authority – namely, that when private 
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individuals cannot enforce the public interest, the duty to guard the 
public interest for them falls to the attorney general:  
 
"It is an inherent function of his [the attorney general's] office 
to protect the public through the courts when they are injured, 
and have a cause of action. Who else could institute or direct a 
suit for the public? Can it be said that the courts would be 
closed to them, and that they would have no remedy against 
wrong or usurpation, if there should be no express law directing 
the attorney general to act? When there is a statute directing 
him, giving a legal remedy, he must be guided by it, but if there 
be [no statutes] the public are not for that reason deprived of 
the right to resort to judicial proceedings for protection against 
wrong."107  
 
At a time when many viewed the legislatures and governors as 
incapable of representing the public interest in the face of the political 
power of business interests, the SAGs' broad common law powers 
provided an opportunity point for pro-regulatory forces. This was true 
in states like Ohio and New York, where the state legislatures for time 
a time declined to enact antitrust legislation. Assisting this role of 
SAGs as an additional opportunity point was the fact that nearly all 
SAGs, and indeed all of the SAGs who brought the quo warranto suits 
against the trusts listed in Table 2, were elected independently from 
the governors and state legislatures and (unlike the U.S. Attorney 
General) not under the control of other executive officials.108  
A number of groups viewed SAGs as potential avenues through 
which to pursue policy goals. For example, in 1888, at a time when the 
emergence of the trusts led to a "thunderous outcry in the press,"109 
the New York Times ran a series of editorials urging the New York SAG 
to act, arguing that his quo warranto powers "should be tested in 
proceedings against some corporation which has been swallowed up by 
a Trust."110 An examination of the leading newspapers during this 
period suggests that a wide range of groups made applications for the 
attorney general to take action against business interests, including 
the Knights of Labor, "disaffected stockholders," small, independent 
producers urging action against monopolistic trusts, and a New York 
citizen committee pressuring the SAG to use his quo warranto powers 
to "force the Manhattan Elevated Railroad Company to provide a seat 
for every passenger between rush hours, to make the stations 
sufficiently large for the comfortable accommodation of travelers, and 
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to equip every platform with adequate roofs."111 Likewise, the Illinois 
SAG's lawsuit against the Chicago Gas Trust Company noted in Table 2 
above followed an application by the Chicago Citizen's Association to 
sue the trust.112  
This could act as somewhat of a two-sided coin for SAGs, as 
those who did not act were often subjects of public comment and 
criticism. For example, the New York Times noted in 1890 that the 
Massachusetts SAG’s failure to take action against the "offending 
corporations" was "at last becoming the subject of comment in 
Boston." The Times goes on to note that the editorial board of the 
Boston Herald was also beginning to apply pressure on the attorney 
general, arguing that "the time has now come" for the SAG "to put the 
machinery of his office in operation for the purpose of testing the 
matter."113 Much of this criticism arose out of the expectation of the 
attorney general to act, particularly as "the people [were] to obtain 
the relief to which they are entitled" only through "official 
investigation, followed by actions brought in the courts by public 
prosecutors."114 Because the attorney general had such broad control 
over the representation of the public interest, much of the attention – 
both positive and negative – focused on his office.  
The broad control SAGs maintained over state litigation in turn 
highlights another structural feature of the SAGs. SAGs maintain a 
great deal of prosecutorial discretion in handling their caseload, 
choosing whether or not to bring actions with little interference by 
other officials. Because "[a]s the representative of the state, an 
attorney-general is empowered to bring any action which he deems 
necessary for the protection of the public interests,"115 the SAG has 
the ability to define the "public interest" such that "as litigator [the 
SAG] can substantially influence public policy."116 The SAGs’ wide 
discretion allowed them the possibility of resisting public pressure. The 
Massachusetts SAG mentioned above, for example, opted not to 
prosecute the trusts despite the public pressure. Likewise, early in the 
nineteenth century, the Kansas SAG settled with Standard Oil rather 
than follow the public calls to prosecute, in large measure because of 
his faith in the American free enterprise system and because he 
apparently had no desire to punish a leading local industry.117  
Further, the SAGs' role as public prosecutors allowed them to 
cloak themselves in an appearance of neutrality even though they 
were elected, political actors. This recalls political scientist Eugene 
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Lewis's notion that a key practice by political entrepreneurs is their 
creation of an “apolitical shield” making their actions appear "to be 
free of partisanship, greed, self-interest and personal self-
aggrandizement.118 Ohio SAG David K. Watson, for instance, framed 
his participation in his lawsuit against Standard Oil as a "matter of 
duty." As he put it, "I had no personal feeling against the Standard Oil 
Company, but I meant to enforce the law against it as I would against 
any other company which I believed to be violating the law."119 This 
cloak of neutrality was important in the context of Ohio state politics at 
the time, which was dominated on the state level by pro-business 
Republicans wary of antitrust actions.120  
Of course, many of Watson’s Republican colleagues in Ohio 
disagreed that this was simply a matter of Watson’s "duty" such that 
he had little choice in the matter.121 The same was true of other SAGs 
who framed their actions as straightforward law enforcement 
responding to corporate "abuses" or "violations" under law.122 Indeed, 
critics of Democratic New York SAG Charles Tabor labeled his lawsuit 
against the Sugar Trust a "Tammany Suit" because it allegedly aimed 
to place pressure on Republicans in the General Assembly to enact 
antitrust legislation.123 An official at the American Smelting and 
Refining Company accused Colorado SAG C.C. Post, who had just 
brought quo warranto suit against them, of bringing the suit for 
"political purposes to curry favor with the Populists."124 Yet similarly to 
judges cloaking themselves in the language of the law, it is easier as a 
public prosecutor to publicly maintain that the decision to litigate is a 
simple matter of neutrally "following the law" than it is for a legislator 
or governor, whose actions are more likely to be seen as mere 
"political decisions." This dynamic provides a partial explanation for 
why Watson was able to sue Standard Oil successfully even with the 
political deck stacked against him.125  
In short, SAGs during the Gilded Age occupied a unique position 
as a sort of "pressure release valve" for public anxieties existing 
concurrent with the rise of large business interests. At a time in which 
administrative agencies were weak or non-existent, and other political 
actors had not or would not act, a number of SAGs responded to this 
public outrage by relying on the tools and advantages inherent in their 
office. Their electoral independence and wide prosecutorial discretion, 
as well as their ability to cloak themselves in the neutrality of the law, 
assisted their ability to act in the "public interest" and to reinforce a 
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republican notion that the ultimate control of corporate power 
rightfully resided with the public.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
several SAGs used their unique position to pursue the "public interest" 
by regulating the activities of the large commercial sector emerging in 
America's Gilded Age by means of innovative common law litigation. 
This activity evolved with changing circumstances throughout the 
nineteenth century, as SAGs sought to achieve business regulation 
through public nuisance theories, and, with the emergence of the 
trusts, to vindicate the "public interest" by using quo warranto powers 
against the trusts.  
The SAGs' litigation during this time was important for a number 
of reasons. For one, the SAGs' pursuit of the "public interest" during 
this era serves as a partial corrective to the notion that the law during 
the nineteenth century chiefly reflected governments' wish to enhance 
the economic interests of private actors. As employed by SAGs, the 
common law served not as a barrier to "democratic excess," but as an 
expression of the public's interest vis-à-vis the great corporations. 
Contrary to bolstering liberal "laissez-faire" ideologies, this common 
law regulation through litigation reflected a certain republicanism in 
viewing the rightful role of corporations as expressions of the public 
interest. To that end, SAGs were willing to use injunctions and even 
seek "corporate death" through quo warranto if corporations abused 
their role.  
The SAGs' common law litigation also highlights an 
underappreciated way in which entrepreneurial actors could seek 
stricter regulation of corporations at a time in which administrative 
solutions were largely unavailable. Several of the perceived social ills 
targeted by the SAGs' litigation – environmental harms, the "trusts", 
problems caused by the railroads – faced regulatory controls weaker 
than that demanded by key elements of the public. While pro-
regulatory forces pushed for a stronger regulatory state to address 
these emerging issues of industrialization, they simultaneously looked 
to other avenues to potentially achieve these goals. SAG common law 
litigation was one such avenue available to fill the widening "regulatory 
gaps" during this period. As state actors clothed with electoral 
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independence from other state political institutions and the ability to 
represent the state in litigation, SAGs provided a promising avenue for 
a public demanding action, even if other institutions seemed to be 
turning a deaf ear. SAGs such as Ohio's David Watson were able to 
use their institutional advantages to channel public outrage against the 
"trusts" even in the context of institutional hostility.  
While the SAGs' efforts to use the common law in this way often 
ran into limitations, their litigation often achieved at least short-term 
success in court. Further, the SAGs’ efforts to develop the common law 
had an influence on the development of state and national antitrust 
policy, providing a precedent for the government's role in attacking 
trusts. In this way, SAG common law litigation served as an important 
bridge between existing regulatory gaps and the more systematic 
regulatory state that emerged in the Progressive Era and New Deal 
period.  
The regulatory "gap-filling" role of this early SAG common law 
litigation also helps to place the role of modern-day SAGs in greater 
context. Initially, with the creation of the federal and state 
administrative state and the explosion of statutory law that occurred in 
the twentieth century, the SAGs' use of the common law to regulate 
business dwindled.126 In more recent times, however, these state 
public prosecutors have revived common law litigation. Recently, for 
example, SAGs have used common law public nuisance theories to 
tackle a variety of public harms not explicitly regulated by statute or 
administrative regulation. The most prominent recent litigation 
campaign involved the numerous SAG lawsuits targeting the nation's 
largest tobacco firms in the late 1990s, which ultimately ended in a 
massive $200+ billion settlement containing new regulations on the 
industry and involving nearly all the nation's SAGs.127 Among other 
causes of action in this litigation, SAGs included claims for public 
nuisance, arguing that the tobacco companies' marketing and 
distribution practices "intentionally and unreasonably interfered with 
the public's right to be free from unwarranted injury, disease and 
sickness, and have caused damage to the public health, the public 
safety and the general welfare of the citizens."128 While having a 
significant impact on national tobacco regulation, this effort occurred 
in the face of congressional and administrative inaction on the issue. 
SAGs have also used public nuisance theories to tackle problems of 
climate change left largely unaddressed by Congress, attempting to 
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gain injunctions against power plants emitting large amounts of carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere.129 Other recent SAG uses of common law 
public nuisance theories include lawsuits against manufacturers of 
firearms and lead paint.130  
In these cases, as with the public nuisance cases of their 
predecessors in the Gilded Age, SAGs have used the common law to 
address emerging public issues when administrative or legislative 
approaches to tackling these problems had not been implemented. For 
Gilded Age SAGs, public nuisance served as a regulatory tool in the era 
before the fully developed post-New Deal administrative state. For 
contemporary SAGs, public nuisance has served as a regulatory device 
when other political actors – such as Congress or the Environmental 
Protection Agency – had declined to regulate certain alleged harms.  
Unlike public nuisance, which has witnessed a renaissance 
among SAG litigants in recent years, the common law tool of quo 
warranto is no longer an important part of the SAGs' legal repertoire. 
As noted above, several states codified in their antitrust statutes the 
SAGs' early use of quo warranto to attack monopolies, but the use of 
quo warranto generally left usage largely because the emergence of 
loose general incorporation statutes made the use of this extraordinary 
legal remedy impractical, and because the chief legal remedy 
associated with quo warranto – revocation of corporate charters and 
subsequent "corporate death" – was viewed as too blunt a weapon.  
However, the SAGs' use of quo warranto in antitrust 
prosecutions played a role in the SAGs' own institutional development, 
as the difficulty of the SAGs' early antitrust regime to control the trusts 
led to the SAGs modernizing their own legal mechanisms. The SAGs' 
formation of the National Association of Attorneys General was 
precipitated by the long-term ineffectiveness and inefficiencies of 
single-state prosecution of the trusts. Through this new organization, 
the SAGs combined efforts against the trusts and other corporate 
entities, thus avoiding duplication and allowing better legal 
coordination against corporate enterprises increasingly operating 
across state lines. NAAG still exists today as a forum for SAG 
collaboration and has been critical in coordinating recent litigation 
initiated by SAGs, including those modern-day campaigns noted 
above.131 
State attorneys general were among the many actors during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries helping to craft legal and 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Polity, Vol 44, No. 3 (2012): pg. 373-399. DOI. This article is © Palgrave Macmillan and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Palgrave Macmillan] does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Palgrave Macmillan. 
31 
 
political development during this key era of industrialization. Scholars 
exploring political development during this period should consider the 
role of public prosecutors, along with state judges, legislatures, and 
private interest groups, in this development. Particularly as modern-
day SAGs make headlines with their "regulation through litigation" in 
areas from tobacco policy to global warming, the actions of SAGs 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries serve as a 
reminder that government prosecutors' use of litigation to regulate 
business has roots tracing back to the early days of American 
industrialization. 
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(11), Illinois (9), and New York (8).  
43 See State v. Grand Trunk Railway of Canada, 59 Me. 189 (1871); Attorney-
General v. Delaware and Bound Brook Railroad Co. 27 N.J. Eq. 1 
(1876); People v. New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad Co., 89 
N.Y. 266 (1882).  
44 Attorney General v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co., 35 Wis. 425 
(1874).  
45 See, for example, State v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 75 N.H. 327 (1909).  
46 Louisville, Henderson & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 
625 (1911) (involving a failure to provide a "suitable and convenient 
water closet"); Attorney General v. North Jersey Street Railway Co., 
54 N.J. Eq. 263 (1896) (involving the placement of poles and wires 
associated with an electric street railway).  
47 Attorney General v. Chicago and Evanston Railroad Co., et al., 112 Ill. 611 
(1884).  
48 State v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 71 Kan. 613 (1905).  
49 Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 158 Ky. 773 (1914).  
50 Commonwealth v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railroad Co., 139 
Ky. 429 (1908).  
51 Hunt v. Chicago Horse and Dummy Railway Co., 121 Ill. 638, 649 (1887). 
Though the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower court in this 
case, the Supreme Court adopted the lower court's analysis of the 
power of the attorney general to bring this suit in a note to its full 
opinion.   
52 In Illinois, for example, each county's State's Attorney had the power to 
bring quo warranto actions in addition to the Attorney General. See, 
for example, People, ex rel. Charles S. Deneen, State's Attorney v. The 
People's Gas Light and Coke Company, 205 Ill. 482 (1903).  
53 Morag-Levine, Chasing the Wind, 57. This was in reference to the use of 
common law to control industrial pollution in England, but similar limits 
on the common law in America also existed.  
54 Attorney General v. Tudor Ice Co., 104 Mass. 239, 240-241 (1870).  
55 James L. High, A Treatise on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed. 
(Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1896), §592-§593.  
56 Chester James Antieau, The Practice of Extraordinary Remedies (New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1987), §4.07.  
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57 Lawrence Meir Friedman, A History of American Law, 3d ed. (New York: 
Touchstone, 2005), 129-135.  
58 David Scuilli, Corporations vs. the Court: Private Power, Public Interests 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 91.  
59 To take one of hundreds of potential examples, see State ex rel. Attorney-
General v. Gilbreath, 48 Mo. 107 (1871) (involving the Missouri SAG's 
use of quo warranto to oust a justice of a county court).  
60 People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582 (N.Y. 1890).  
61 The following terms were used in this Lexis-Nexis search of the years 1865 
to 1915: ["quo warranto" and ((name(state or people or "attorney 
general")) or counsel("state of Alabama" or "attorney general" or 
"atty. general" or "attorney gen." or "atty. gen." or "atty.-gen." or 
"attorney gen."))]. I proceeded with a search of each jurisdiction as I 
did above (see note 41). Because the search results included many 
quo warranto cases brought against individuals to remove them from 
office, I included in my case count only those cases brought against 
corporations, not including cases in which "quo warranto" appeared in 
the language of the opinion only in passing.  
62 State v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 69 Ohio St. 317 (1904). Also see Ohio v. 
Interstate Savings Investment Co., 64 Ohio St. 283 (1901); State v. 
Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co., 39 Minn. 538 (1888); State v. 
Manufacturer's Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 91 Mo. 311 (1886); State v. 
Vigilant Insurance Co. of Nimrod, 30 Kan. 585 (1883).  
63 Attorney General v. Detroit & Saline Plank Road Co., 97 Mich. 589 (1893); 
People v. Lake Superior Ship Canal, Railroad & Iron Co., 32 Mich. 233 
(1875).  
64 State v. Twin Village Water Co., 98 Me. 214 (1903); State v. Washington 
Steam Fire Co. No. 3, 76 Miss. 449 (1898); People v. Plymouth Plank 
Road Co., 31 Mich. 178 (1875).  
65 State v. Park & Nelson Lumber Co., 58 Minn. 330 (1894); State v. 
Nebraska Home Co., 66 Neb. 349 (1902).  
66 State v. Boatsmen's Savings Inst., 48 Mo. 189 (1871); State v. Toledo 
Home Telephone Co., 72 Ohio St. 60 (1905).   
67 See, for example, State v. Missouri Athletic Club, 261 Mo. 576 (1914).  
68 Commonwealth v. Potter County Water Co., 212 Pa. 463 (1905).  
69 Attorney General v. Erie & Kalamazoo Railroad Co., 55 Mich. 15 (1884); 
State v. Duluth Street Railway Co., 128 Minn. 314 (1915); State v. 
Sioux City & Northern Railroad Co., 43 Minn. 17 (1890); State v. 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 25 Neb. 156 (1888).  
70 The regions noted in Table 1 include the states in the four main census 
regions used by the U.S. Census Bureau. Ohio conducted 62 quo 
warranto cases against business in this period, followed by Missouri 
(59) and Illinois (41).  
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71 This includes the Granger Laws enacted in several Midwest states, including 
the laws later upheld by the Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 
113 (1877).  
72 See Ron Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. (New York: 
Random House, 1998).  
73 S.C.T. Dodd, "The Present Legal Status of the Trusts," Harvard Law Review 
7 (1893) 157-158.  
74 See, for example, "Chicago’s Gas Trust," New York Times, February 4, 
1888, 2.  
75 William L. Letwin, "Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law," University of 
Chicago Law Review 23 (1956): 222 (noting that "between 1888 and 
1890, there were few who doubted that the public hated the trusts 
fervently").  
76 People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 283-287 (1889).  
77 State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700 (1890).  
78 People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582 (N.Y. 1890).  
79 People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 302.  
80 Walter Chadwick Noyes, A Treatise on the Law of Intercorporate Relations, 
2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907), §448 (noting 
several state statutes providing for the forfeiture of corporate charters 
for antitrust violations). State courts found this to be the case as well. 
For example, see State v. Boeckler Lumber Co., 206.  
81 Bruce Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1979), 43.  
82 Will Wilson, "The State Antitrust Laws," American Bar Association Journal 
47 (1961): 160, 161.  
83 For a good overview of state antitrust laws and the remedies allowed under 
these statutes written shortly after these laws were enacted, see 
Arthur Jerome Eddy, The Law of Combinations, Vol. 2 (Chicago: 
Callaghan and Co., 1901), especially Part VIII.  
84 Cong. Rec., 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1890, 21, pt. 3: 2460.  
85 Ibid., 2456-2459.   
86 Cong. Rec., 50th Cong., 2nd sess., 1889, 20, pt. 2: 1167.  
87 Following the path-breaking Cotton Seed Oil Trust case in Louisiana, for 
example, the trust simply transferred its assets to Rhode Island. 
"Trusts in the Courts," New York Times, January 8, 1890, 4.  
88 McCurdy, "The Knight Sugar Decision," 322-323.  
89 Cong. Rec., 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1890, 21, pt. 3: 2456, 2460.  
90 Ibid., 2457.  
91 Bringhurst, Oil Monopoly, 3.  
92 For examples of criticism, see "The Government and the Anti-Trust Law," 
New York Times, June 16, 1892, 4 (arguing the DOJ's Sherman Act 
litigation has been "farcical from the beginning"); "Sherman for the 
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Trusts," New York Times, October 13, 1892 (arguing the federal 
government's antitrust actions included "sham indictments").  
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Science Quarterly 15 (1900): 349.  
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97 Ibid., 567-568.  
98 Ibid., 291-292.  
99 Indiana Attorney General, Biennial Report for the Year November 1, 1900 
to October 31, 1901 (Indianapolis, 1902), 25, as cited in McCurdy, 
"The Sugar Knight Decision," 341.  
100 For examples of state antitrust prosecutions following enactment antitrust 
statutes, see "St. Louis Trust Companies," New York Times, Oct. 18, 
1897; "Move Against Southern Road," New York Times, Feb. 5, 1901; 
"Northern Securities Suit in Minnesota," New York Times, Apr. 20, 
1902; "Texas Wars on Business," New York Times, Aug. 20, 1903; 
Queen Insurance Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250 (1893); State v. Standard 
Oil, 61 Neb. 28 (1900); State v. Buckeye Pipeline Co., 61 Ohio St. 520 
(1900); Hammond Packing Co. v. State, 81 Ark. 519 (1907); State v. 
Standard Oil, 218 Mo. 349 (1909).  
101 193 U.S. 197 (1904). Before the United States became involved in 
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Minnesota Governor and SAG. "Gov. Van Sant Takes Action," New York 
Times, December 19, 1901.  
102 "State Attorneys to Petition Congress," New York Times, October 2, 1907; 
"Would Curb Power of Federal Courts," New York Times, October 1, 
1907.   
103 These coordinated efforts included those of Tennessee and Missouri. See 
Bringhurst, Oil Monopoly, chap. 4.  
104 For example, in Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632 (1889), a private 
business owner sued a principal of the Diamond Match Company (the 
"Match Trust"), seeking to enjoin the trust's sale of stock.  
105 Horace Gay Wood, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Nuisances in Their 
Various Forms, 3d. ed. (San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Co., 1893), 
853.  
106 State v. Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing Co., 40 Minn. 213, 214 (1889). 
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National Bank of the Commonwealth, 126 Mass. 300 (1879); Hunt v. 
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Louis Gas Trust," New York Times, Feb. 4, 1888, 4; "War On The Oil 
Monopoly: An Application Made to the Attorney General," New York 
Times, Mar. 18, 1891; "Can Force Elevated Road Reforms: Lawyers 
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1903, 2.  
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Edward Thompson Co., 1914), §740.  
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120 Bringhurst, Oil Monopoly, 12-14.  
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laws").  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Polity, Vol 44, No. 3 (2012): pg. 373-399. DOI. This article is © Palgrave Macmillan and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Palgrave Macmillan] does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Palgrave Macmillan. 
39 
 
123 William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America (New York: Random 
House, 1965), 82-83, fn. 8.  
124 "Colorado Sues to End Smelter Trust."  
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Table 1. Quo Warranto Litigation against Corporations, By Region, 1865-
1915   
 
Region Number of Cases % of Cases 
Northeast 60 14.9% 
South 40 9.9% 
Midwest 272 67.5% 
West 31 7.7% 
Source: Author's compilation from searches of the Lexis-Nexis legal database  
 
Table 2. Significant State Attorney General Quo Warranto Litigation Against 
the Trusts   
 
State 
SAG 
Party 
Defendant 
Year 
Initiated 
Litigation Result 
LA D 
American Cotton Oil Trust 
("the Cottonseed Trust") 
1887 
Enjoined from 
doing business in 
state 
NY D 
North River Sugar Refining 
Company 
("the Sugar Trust") 
1888 Dissolution of trust 
IL R 
Chicago Gas Trust Company 
("the Gas Trust") 
1888 Dissolution of trust 
CA D 
American Sugar Refining 
Company 
("the Sugar Trust") 
1889 Dissolution of trust 
NE R 
Nebraska Distilling Company 
("the Whisky Trust") 
1890 Dissolution of trust 
OH R 
Standard Oil 
("the Oil Trust") 
1890 Ousted from trust 
IL D 
United States School 
Furniture Company ("the 
Furniture Trust") 
1894 Dissolution of Trust 
IL D 
Distilling and Cattle Feeding 
Company 
("the Whisky Trust") 
1895 Dissolution of Trust 
MO D 
Armour Packing Company 
("the Meat-Packing Trust") 
1902 
Ordered to pay 
fines and costs 
CO Populist 
American Smelting and 
Refining Company ("the 
Smelter Trust") 
1902 
Dismissed on 
procedural grounds 
 
Source: Author's compilation from searches of the Lexis-Nexis legal database    
